By Rudy
Barnes, Jr., September 3, 2016
With
the end of the Cold War in 1991 the forces of globalization began to reshape
the world’s threat environment. It began
with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, which initiated a U.S. response with Desert
Shield/Storm—the first invasion of Iraq under President Bush, the elder. It was successful in liberating Kuwait, but
the later humanitarian assistance mission into Somalia by President Clinton was
aborted after Blackhawk Down. Then came 9/11. It put the threat of Islamist terrorism into
sharper focus—one that demanded an immediate military response.
After
two major invasions in the Middle East (euphemistically referred to as military
interventions), first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, it now seems clear that
a containment strategy is needed to replace one of military intervention. The military capabilities needed for a
containment strategy are unique since their primary mission is indirect. It is to advise and assist indigenous
(Muslim) security forces, and requires that U.S. advisers and trainers have the
cultural and religious background and language capabilities needed to gain the
trust and confidence of their counterparts while keeping a low profile in a
hostile cultural environment.
The
diplomat-warrior is required to bridge the chasm between the diplomat corps of
the State Department (DOS) and the military corps of the Defense Department
(DOD). To bridge that formidable interagency
gap the diplomat-warrior must have attributes unique to military
personnel. Among existing military
personnel, those attributes of Civil Affairs (CA) personnel most closely
correspond to the diplomat-warrior; but the CA mission relates to local civilians,
and does not include advising and training indigenous military personnel.
The
capability for diplomat-warriors could be a mix of CA and Army Special Forces
(SF) personnel, since both are Special Operations Forces (SOF) within the
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). In fact, integrated CA and SF teams were commonplace
in regional Special Action Forces that predated Geographical Combatant Commands
and the creation of USSOCOM in 1986. But
since then turf wars within DOD have made the status of CA—whether it is a
conventional or unconventional force—ambiguous.
It’s time to clarify that ambiguity and match military capabilities with
the missions of a containment strategy.
Conflicting
bureaucratic cultures in DOD and DOS represent a daunting challenge for the
diplomat-warrior. Within DOD, the cult
of the warrior prevails. The direct
action missions of the Army’s Delta Force and the Navy’s Seals are given
priority within USSOCOM, but those super-warriors are unsuited for the indirect
action missions of diplomat-warriors who must understand a foreign culture,
speak its language and build the trust and confidence of indigenous forces to
achieve their political objectives. Too
much emphasis on direct action missions within USSOCOM can undermine the
support needed for the indirect missions of the diplomat-warrior.
Then
there is the age-old friction between DOS and DOD personnel to further
complicate matters. Interagency conflict
often jeopardized mission success in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Diplomat-warriors must
operate within the realms of both DOS and DOD to achieve U.S. political
objectives, so that interagency bureaucratic conflicts must be reconciled to
avoid jeopardizing mission success.
Overcoming
U.S. bureaucratic dysfunctions is only the beginning. The primary challenge for the
diplomat-warrior in the Middle East and Africa is a complex and shifting environment
of conflicting national, ethnic, religious and tribal interests that defies peace
in the region. In the past only
oppressive dictators like Saddam Hussein of Iraq, Muammar Qaddafi of Libya and
Bashar al-Assad of Syria were able to maintain any semblance of order in the
region.
The
success of a U.S. containment strategy in such a volatile region requires
diplomat-warriors who can navigate the hostile human terrain to promote political
reconciliation among those seeking to divide and conquer their many—and constantly
shifting—enemies. The objective must
begin with creating a semblance of order out of chaos and anarchy within
realistic boundaries; and it must be based on Islamic principles and law
(shari’a) that embrace fundamental freedoms that begin with the freedoms of
religion and speech.
Promoting
reconciliation and peace in such a divided and violent environment requires a
mix of religion and politics that may seem anathema to most Americans, but is the
norm for most Muslims. The beginning
point should be the greatest commandment
to love God and neighbor—with our neighbors including those of other
religions. It is a common word of faith for Jews, Christians and Muslims, and it can
be the foundation for a politics of reconciliation and peace in Islamic cultures
since it supports the fundamental human rights essential for liberty in law.
Islam
is a religious and political ideology that can bring reconciliation, peace and
justice to Islamic cultures, but only if shari’a embraces fundamental human
rights that begin with the freedoms of religion and speech. That can happen if Muslims in Islamic nations
acknowledge the greatest commandment to
be at the foundation of shari’a; and the first evidence of that will be the
elimination of apostasy and blasphemy laws that are now so prevalent in Islamic
nations.
Notes
and references:
On the need for the diplomat
warrior whenever public support is a political objective of U.S. military
operations, see The Diplomat Warrior,
Military Review, May 1990, pp 55-63, at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B0khhnnLsL75VWg0cV9Dc1dVNXc/view?usp=sharing; see also Civil Affairs: Diplomat-Warriors in
Contemporary Conflict, Special Warfare, Winter 1991, at
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lMxiDFtg9UPOsOddWsaeZGNOKkKcGPpsNp1dkJdVRYOilpfIB5hMS2uJfqhWg7nz6KM0Yd568lIWqFap/view. Generally, on the background and role of the diplomat
warrior and concepts of legitimacy in U.S. policy and strategy, see Military
Legitimacy: Might and Right in the New Millennium, chapters 5 & 6, at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3gvZV8mXUp-VmpMUV9sSU9kaDA/view.
For a more recent article on diplomat-warriors
in Islamic cultures since 9/11, see Back
to the Future: Human Rights and Legitimacy in the Training and Advisory Mission,
Special Warfare, Jan.-Mar. 2013, pp 42-47, at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3gvZV8mXUp-eVRlcWFENHNUVUE/view.
On how competing national,
ethnic, religious and tribal loyalties are foiling a weak U.S. policy in Syria,
see https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/without-american-leadership-in-syria-us-allies-fight-each-other/2016/08/30/40727b1a-6ede-11e6-9705-23e51a2f424d_story.html?utm_term=.248e19aefb2c&wpisrc=nl_opinions&wpmm=1.
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